Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel, Earls of"

movement of the guns are regulated by the necessity of coming quickly into action; the usual place for the arm is at or near the heads of the combatant columns, i.e. as far forward as is consistent with safety. Safety is further provided for by an "escort," or, if such be not detailed, by the nearest infantry or cavalry. In attack, the role of the field artillery is usually (1) to assist if necessary the advanced guard in the preliminary fighting--for this purpose a battery is usually assigned to that corps of troops, other batteries also being sent up to the front as required, (2) to prepare, and (3) to support or cover the infantry attack. "Preparation" consists chiefly in engaging and subduing the hostile artillery. This is often spoken of as the "artillery duel," and is not a meaningless bombardment, but an essential preliminary to the advance. Massed guns with modern shrapnel would, if allowed to play freely upon the attack, infallibly stop, and probably annihilate, the troops making it. The task of the guns, then, is to destroy the opposing guns and artillerymen, a task which will engage almost all the resources of the assailant's artillery in the struggle for artillery superiority. Shielded guns, enhanced rate of fire, perfection in indirect laying apparatus, and many other factors, have modified the lessons of 1870, and complicated the work of achieving victory in the artillery duel so far that the simple "hard pounding" of former days has given way to a variety of expedients for inflicting the desired loss and damage, as to which opinions differ in and within every army. One point is, however, clear and meets with universal acceptance. "The whole object of the duel is to enable the artillery subsequently to devote all available resources to its principal task, which is the material and moral support of the infantry during each succeeding stage of the fight" (French regulations). One side must be victorious in the end, and when, and not until, the hostile artillery is beaten out of action, the victor has acquired the power of pressing home the attack. The British regulations (1906), indeed, deal with the steps to be taken when, though the artillery of the attack is beaten, the infantry advance is continued, but only so as to order the guns to "reopen at all costs," in other words, as a forlorn hope. The second part of the preparation, the gradual disintegration of the opposing line of infantry, has practically disappeared from the drill books. The next task of the guns, and that in which modern artillery asserts its power to the utmost, is the _support_ of the infantry attack. The artillery and infantry co-operate, "the former by firing rapidly when they see their own infantry ... press forward, and the latter by making full use of the periods of intense artillery fire to gain ground" (British _F.A. Training_, 1906). Thus aided, the infantry closes in to decisive ranges, and as it gains ground to the front, every gun "must be at once turned upon the points selected ... the most effective support afforded to the attacking infantry by the concentrated fire of guns and field howitzers. The former tie the defenders to their entrenchments (for retreat is practically impossible over ground swept by shrapnel bullets), distract their attention and tend to make them keep their heads down, while the shell from the field howitzers searches out the interior of the trenches, the reverse slopes of the position, and checks the movement of reinforcements towards the threatened point." In these words the British Field Artillery drill-book of 1902 summarizes the act of "covering" the infantry advance. Unofficial publications are still more emphatic. The advance of the infantry to decisive range would often be covered by a mass of one hundred or more field guns, firing shrapnel at the rate of ten rounds per gun per minute at the critical moment. Against such a storm of fire the defending infantry, even supposing that its own guns had refitted and were again in action, would be powerless. It is in recognition of the appalling power of field artillery (which has increased in a ratio out of all proportion to the improvements of modern rifles) that the French system has been elaborated to the perfection which it has now attained. With modern guns and modern tactics artillery almost invariably fires over the heads of its own infantry. The German regulations indeed say that it should be avoided as far as possible, but, as a matter of fact, if the numerous guns of a modern army (at Koniggratz there were 1550 guns on the field, at Gravelotte 1252, at Mukden 3000) were to be given a clear front, there would be no room for deploying the infantry. Consequently the French regulations, in which the power of the artillery is given the greatest possible scope, say that "it almost always fires over the heads of its own infantry." With field guns and on level ground it is considered dangerous that infantry in front of the guns should be less than 600 yds. distant--not for fear of the shells striking the infantry, but because the fragments resulting from a "premature" burst are dangerous up to that distance. The question of distance is more important in connexion with the "covering" of the assault. Up to a point, the artillery enables the attacking infantry to advance with a minimum of loss and exhaustion, and thus to close with the enemy at least on equal terms, if not with a serious advantage, for the fire of the guns may shake, perhaps almost destroy the enemy's power of resistance. But when the infantry approaches the enemy the guns can no longer fire upon the latter's front line without risk of injuring their friends. All that they can do, when the opposing infantries can see the whites of each other's eyes, is to lengthen the fuze, raise the trajectory and sweep the ground where the enemy's supports are posted. Under these circumstances it is practically agreed that the risk should be taken without hesitation at so critical a moment as that of a decisive infantry assault which must be pushed home at whatever cost. "It will be better for the infantry to chance a few friendly shells than to be received at short range with a fresh outburst of hostile rifle fire" (Rouquerol, _Tactical Employment of Quick-firing Field Artillery_). Thus, the distance at which direct support ceases, formerly 600 yds., has been diminished to 100, and even to 50 yds. Howitzers can, of course, maintain their fire almost up to the very last stage, and, in general, high-explosive shell, owing to its purely local effect, may be employed for some time after it has become unsafe to use shrapnel.